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The aviation community has very stringent navigation integrity requirements that apply to a variety of 
manned and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operational tasks.  This paper presents the results of 
the research activities carried out by the Italian Air Force Flight Test Centre (CSV-RSV) in 
collaboration with the Nottingham Geospatial Institute (NGI) and Cranfield University (CU) in the 
area of Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) for mission- and safety-critical GNSS 
applications.  Based on these activities, suitable models were developed to describe the main causes of 
GNSS signal outage and degradation in flight, namely: antenna obscuration, multipath, fading due to 
adverse geometry and Doppler shift.  Adopting these models in association with suitable integrity 
thresholds and guidance algorithms, the ABIA system delivers integrity caution (predictive) and 
warning (reactive) flags, as well as steering information to the pilot and electronic commands to the 
aircraft/UAV flight control system.  These features allow real-time avoidance of safety-critical flight 
conditions and fast recovery of the required navigation performance in case of GNSS data losses.  
This paper presents the key ABIA concepts, architecture and mathematical models.  A successive 
paper will address the ABIA integrity thresholds criteria and detailed results of a TORNADO-IDS 
simulation case-study.    
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1. INTRODUCTION.  GNSS alone does not always provide adequate performance, 
particularly in demanding air vehicle applications where high levels of integrity are required.  
For an avionics navigation system, integrity directly relates to the level of confidence that can 
be placed in the information provided by the on-board system.  It includes the ability of the 
navigation system to provide timely and valid warnings to users when the system must not be 
used for the intended operation or phase of flight.  Specifically, an avionics navigation system 
is required to deliver an alert of any malfunction (as a result of a set alert threshold being 
exceeded) to users within a given period of time.  Time-to-alert (TTA) is defined as the 
maximum time allowed from the moment a fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected 
to the moment that the user is made aware of it (Ochieng et al., 2003).  Integrity risk, also 
referred to as the probability of misleading information, is defined as the probability that the 
navigation positioning error exceeds the alert limit and that the event is not detected.  Loss of 
integrity can happen in one of two ways.  Either an unsafe condition is not detected or it is 
detected, but the alert is not received by the user within the required TTA.  The alert limit 
defines the largest position error, which results in a safe operation.  This is specified such that 
the error can degrade to a level larger than the 95th percentile accuracy requirement but still 
within a safe limit.  GNSS augmentation can take many forms but all share the same 
fundamental principle of providing supplementary information whose objective is improving 
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the performance and/or trustworthiness of the system.  GNSS augmentation benefits in the 
aviation domain can be summarized as follows: 
 Increased runway access, more direct en-route flight paths and new precision 
approach services; 
 Reduced and simplified avionics equipment; 
 Potential elimination of some ground-based navigation aids (VOR, ILS, etc.) with cost 
saving to Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). 
 In addition to the existing Space and Ground Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS and 
GBAS), GNSS augmentation may take the form of additional information being provided by 
other on-board avionics systems.  As these systems normally operate via separate principles 
than the GNSS, they are not subject to the same sources of error or interference.  A system 
such as this is referred to as an Aircraft Based Augmentation System or ABAS (ICAO, 
2005).  ABAS is different from RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring), in 
which the aircraft characteristics (flight dynamics, body shape, antenna location, interference, 
etc.) are not considered.   
 
2. ABIA ARCHITECTURE AND DEFINITIONS.  As a result of extensive research and 
flight test activities performed with GPS-based Time and Space Position Information (TSPI) 
systems on TORNADO-IDS, TYPHOON, MB-339CD and other aircraft (Sabatini and 
Palmerini, 2008), an ABAS concept was developed by CSV-RSV specifically targeting 
GNSS integrity augmentation in TSPI applications (Fig. 1).  In this TSPI Avionics Based 
Integrity Augmentation (T-ABIA) system, the aircraft sensors provide information on the 
aircraft relevant flight parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an Integrity Flag 
Generator (IFG), which is also connected to the on-board GNSS.  The IFG can be 
incorporated into one of the existing airborne computers or can be a dedicated processing 
unit.  Using the available data on GNSS and the aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals 
are generated which can be displayed on one of the cockpit displays and/or sent to an Aural 
Warning Generator (AWG).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  T-ABIA system for flight test applications. 
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 Various modelling, simulation and flight test activities were performed to develop this 
novel T-ABIA system (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008), demonstrating the validity of the 
concept and its technical feasibility.  The next logical step was to extend the results obtained 
with this prototype to the design of a more advanced ABIA system suitable for manned and 
unmanned aircraft applications (both civil and military).  Such a system, can provide steering 
information to the pilot (as the T-ABIA) and, additionally, electronic commands to the 
aircraft/UAV Flight Control System (FCS), allowing for real-time and continuous integrity 
monitoring, avoidance of safety/mission-critical flight conditions and rapid recovery of the 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) in case of GNSS data degradation or loss.  The 
architecture of this advanced ABIA system is depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  ABIA architecture evolution for manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
 
 The systems described above address both the predictive and reactive nature of GNSS 
integrity augmentation.  To understand this concept, let us first of all introduce some key 
definitions of alerts and TTA’s applicable to the ABIA system. 
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation that the GNSS data 
delivered to the avionics system is going to exceed the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) thresholds specified for the current and planned flight 
operational tasks (GNSS alert status). 
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation that the GNSS data delivered 
to the avionics system has exceeded the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
thresholds specified for the current flight operational task (GNSS fault status).  
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time allowed for the caution flag to be 
provided to the user before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition.  
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time allowed from the moment a GNSS 
fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the ABIA system 
provides a warning flag to the user. 
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 Based on the above definitions, we can define two separate models for the time responses 
associated to the Prediction-Avoidance (PA) and Reaction-Correction (RC) functions 
performed by the ABIA system (Fig. 3).  The PA time response is given by: 
 
                                  (1) 
 
where: 
          = time required to predict a critical condition;   
           = time required to communicate the predicted failure to the FPG module; 
        = time required to perform the avoidance manoeuvre.  
 
 In this case, we have             .  If the available avoidance time         is not 
sufficient to perform an adequate avoidance manoeuvre (i.e.,            ), the aircraft 
will inevitably encroach on critical conditions causing GNSS data losses or unacceptable 
accuracy degradations.  In this case, the RC time response applies:  
 
                                   (2) 
 
where: 
         = time required to detect a critical condition; 
           = time required to communicate the failure to the FPG module;  
          = time required to perform the correction manoeuvre. 
 
 
 
                   (a)                          (b) 
 
 
Figure 3.  ABIA PA and RC functions representation. 
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 In general, we must have                         .  The RC time response is 
substantially equivalent to what existing GBAS and SBAS systems are capable of achieving.  
A comparison between Fig. 3(a) and (b) allows to immediately visualise the benefits 
introduced by the ABIA PA function.  Further progress is possible adopting a suitable 
algorithm in the IFG module capable of initiating an early correction manoeuvre as soon as 
the condition        ≤ TTC is violated.  In this case, the direct Prediction-Correction (PC) 
time response would be: 
 
                                          (3) 
 
 This concept is illustrated in Fig. 4.  By comparison with Fig. 2, it is evident that the 
ABIA system would be able to reduce the time required to recover from critical conditions if 
the following inequality is verified: 
 
                                                   (4) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  ABIA PC function representation. 
 
3.  ABIA IFG DEVELOPMENT.  As a first step, a dedicated analysis is required in order to 
determine the flight envelope limitations associated with the use of GNSS.  By analysis, 
simulation and flight test the following models are obtained: 
 
 The Antenna Obscuration Matrixes (AOM) in azimuth and elevation, constructed as a 
function of attitude (Euler) angles in all relevant aircraft configurations; 
 The GNSS Carrier-to-Noise and Jamming-to-Signal Models (CJM), accounting for 
the relevant transmitter/receiver characteristics, propagation losses and RF 
interference; 
 The Multipath Signal Model (MSM) including fuselage, wing and ground path fading 
components and the associated range errors;  
 The Doppler Shift Model (DSM) and associated critical conditions causing GNSS 
tracking issues. 
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 Using appropriate aircraft dynamics models, the manoeuvring envelope of the aircraft is 
determined in all required flight conditions.  Using the AOM, CJM, MSM and DSM models, 
together with the GNSS receiver tracking models and the manoeuvring requirements of 
specific flight tasks (e.g., test/training missions or standard airport approach procedures), it is 
possible to identify the conditions that are potentially critical for the on-board GNSS system 
and set appropriate thresholds for the ABIA CIFs and  WIFs, thereby generating timely alerts 
when the aircraft is performing critical manoeuvres prone to induce GNSS signal outages.  
Once the reliability of the mathematical algorithms is established, the ABIA IFG module is 
implemented in the aircraft to alert the pilot when the critical conditions for GNSS signal 
losses are likely to occur.        
 
 3.1. IFG Module Architecture.  Fig. 5 shows the architecture of ABIA IFG module and its 
interfaces.  This module is designed to provide CIF and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in 
accordance with the specified TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant flight phases).  IFG 
module inputs are from the GNSS receiver and other aircraft sensors.  The GNSS and Sensors 
Layer (GSL) passes the aircraft Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and attitude (Euler angles) 
data (from the on-board INS, Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw measurements and 
PVT)  and the Flight Control System (FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction Layer 
(DEL).  At this stage, the required Navigation and Flight Dynamics (NFD) and GNSS 
Constellation Data (GCD) are extracted, together with the relevant information from an 
Aircraft (A/C) Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and Objects Database 
(TOD).  The 3DM database is a detailed geometric model of the aircraft built in CATIA 
(Computer Aided Three-dimensional Interactive Application).  The TOD uses a Digital 
Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) and additional man-made objects data to obtain a 
detailed map of the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  IFG module architecture. 
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 In the Integrity Processing Layer (IPL) the Doppler Analysis Module (DAM) calculates 
the Doppler shift by processing the NFD and GCD inputs.  The Multipath Analysis Module 
(MAM) processes the 3DM, TOD, GCS and ADS inputs to determine multipath contributions 
from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to the aircraft.   The 
Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM) receives inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS, and 
computes the GNSS antenna(e) obscuration matrixes corresponding to the various aircraft 
manoeuvres.  The Signal Analysis Module (SAM) calculates the link budget of the direct 
GNSS signals received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric propagation 
disturbances (C/N0), as well as the applicable RF interference signal levels (J/S).  The 
Integrity Flags Layer (IFS) uses a set of predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger 
the generation of both caution and warning flags associated with antenna obscuration, 
Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, interference and satellite geometry degradations.   
 
 3.2. Antenna Obscuration Analysis.  Due to the manoeuvres of the aircraft, the wings, tail 
and fuselage will obscure some satellites during the flight.  Fig. 6 shows the structure of the 
AME analysis algorithm.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  GNSS satellite obscuration analysis. 
 
 A Three Degrees of Freedom (3-DOF) model with variable mass was developed to 
calculate the trajectory of the aircraft (i.e., position, velocity and attitude angles) during the 
different flight phases.  Taking into account the aircraft shape (CATIA 3-D model), the 
aircraft flight dynamics (pitch, roll and yaw variations) and the geometric displacement of the 
GNSS satellites in view, the Antenna Obscuration Matrixes (AOM) are generated for the 
different flight conditions.  An examples of AOM obtained with 45° bank angle is shown in 
Fig. 7. 
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Figure 7.  TORNADO-IDS upper antenna AOM (Roll=450). 
 
 Besides the AOM, other factors influence the satellite visibility.  In general, a satellite is 
geometrically visible to the GNSS receiver only if its elevation in the antenna frame is above 
the Earth horizon and the antenna elevation mask.  It should be noted that even high 
performance avionics GNSS antennae have gain patterns that are typically below -3dB at 
about 5 degrees elevation and, as a consequence, their performance become marginal below 
this limit (Fig. 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  High quality antenna gain pattern (L1 frequency). 
 
 In order to determine if a satellite is obscured, the LOS of the satellite with respect to the 
antenna phase centre has to be determined.  To calculate the satellite azimuth and elevation 
with respect to the antenna transformation matrix between ECEF (Earth Centred Earth Fixed) 
and antenna frame must be applied. This is obtained from: 
 
  
    
    
    
  (5) 
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where   
  is the transformation matrix between the aircraft body frame and the antenna frame, 
  
  is the transformation matrix from ENU (East-North-Up) to body frame, and   
  is the 
ECEF to ENU transformation matrix.  As an example, Fig. 9 shows the trajectory of an 
aircraft during a Turning Descent Manoeuvre (TDM) lasting 300 seconds.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Turning descent manoeuvre. 
 
 Fig. 10 shows the combined GPS/GALILEO satellite visibility during the same flight 
phase.  During the manoeuvre, the number of satellites in view varies from 7 to 16. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Satellite Visibility (TDM). 
  
 TORNADO-IDS flight trials showed that the signal losses due to antenna obscuration can 
be reduced by introducing constraints to the aircraft initial heading for left and right turns 
(Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008).  In particular, it was found that the satellite losses are 
minimised by reducing the number of left turns performed with initial heading ranging from 
north-east to south-east, and the number of right turns performed with initial heading between 
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south-west and north-west.  This fact can be explained considering a typical northern 
hemisphere mid-latitude sky plot shown in Fig. 11.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  GPS sky-plot (northern hemisphere mid-latitude). 
 
 Since in the northern hemisphere/mid-latitudes the majority of satellites are available in 
the azimuth range 45  315 degrees, a left turn with an initial heading in the range 45  135 
degrees would be prone to GPS data losses, due to the reduced number of satellites available 
in the direction of the turn.  Similar considerations apply for right turns performed with an 
initial heading in the range 225  315 degrees. 
 
 3.3. GNSS Signal and Interference Analysis.  The received signal strength is affected by a 
number of factors including transmitter and receiver characteristics, propagation losses and 
interferences.  In our case, the SAM combines the various factors contributing to the GNSS 
link budget and signal degradations due to interference.  Multipath induced effects are 
considered separately.  The SAM module takes inputs from the GCS and FDS modules, and 
computes both C/   and J/S.  The ratio of total carrier power to noise C/   in dB-Hz is the 
most generic representation of received signal strength.  This is given by: 
 
 
  
                         (6) 
 
where: 
    =  transmitted power level (dBw); 
   =  satellite antenna gain (dBic); 
   =  receiver antenna gain toward the satellite (dBic); 
   = free space loss (dB);  
   =  atmospheric attenuation in dry-air (dB); 
    =  rainfall attenuation (dB); 
   = tropospheric fading (dB); 
    =  receiver noise figure (dB). 
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 The link budget calculated from Eq. (6) only refers to the direct GNSS signal received 
from a satellite.  Multipath effects, which are due to the geometric and reflective 
characteristics of the environment surrounding the GNSS antenna are not included in this 
calculation and are discussed separately.  The L-band antenna onboard GPS satellites is 
designed to radiate the composite L-band signals to the users on and near the Earth.  As 
shown in Fig. 12, the GPS satellite viewing angle from edge-to-edge of Earth is about 27.7 
degrees (Boithias, 1982).  The satellite antenna is designed to illuminate the Earth’s surface 
with an almost uniform signal strength.  The path loss of the signal is a function of the 
distance from the antenna phase centre to the surface of the Earth. The path loss is minimum 
when the satellite is directly overhead and is maximum at the edge of the coverage area.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 12.  GPS Satellite Antenna Coverage. 
 
 The difference in signal strength caused by this variation in path length is about 2.1 dB [6] 
and the satellite antenna gain can be approximated by: 
 
                      (7) 
 
where E is the elevation angle.  Similarly, the avionics antenna gain pattern shown in Fig. 8 
can be approximated by: 
 
                      (8) 
 
 GNSS signal frequencies (L-band) are sufficiently high to keep the ionospheric delay 
effects relatively small.  On the other hand, they are not so high as to suffer severe 
propagation losses even in rainy conditions.  However, the atmosphere causes small but non-
negligible effects that must be taken into account.  The major effects that the atmosphere has 
on GNSS signals include (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996): 
 
 Ionospheric group delay/carrier phase advance;  
 Tropospheric group delay; 
 Ionospheric scintillation; 
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 Tropospheric attenuation; 
 Tropospheric scintillation. 
 
 The first two effects have a significant impact on GNSS data accuracy but do not directly 
affect the received signal strength (C/N0).  Ionospheric scintillation is due to irregularities in 
the electron density of the Earth’s ionosphere (scale size from hundreds of meters to  
kilometres), producing a variety of local diffraction and refraction effects.  These effects 
cause short-term signal fading, which can severely stress the tracking capabilities of a GNSS 
receiver.  Signal enhancements can also occur for very short periods, but these are not really 
useful from the GNSS receiver perspective.  Atmospheric scintillation effects are more 
significant in the equatorial and sub-equatorial regions and tend to be less of a factor at 
European and North-American latitudes.  Unfortunately, at the moment, there is little we can 
do to estimate ionospheric scintillation effects and no efficient algorithms are available for 
integration in the ABIA system.  Tropospheric attenuation in the GNSS frequency bands is 
dominated by oxygen and the effects of other chemical species can be neglected for most 
applications.  Oxygen attenuation (A) is in the order of 0.035 dB for a satellite at zenith and 
its variation with elevation angle (E) can be approximated by (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996): 
 
 ( )  
    
          
   (  )                   (9) 
 
 ( )  
     
    
  (  )                 
 
(10) 
 These formulae provide acceptable results only if E > 3 degrees.  However, since several 
other errors affects measurements from satellites with elevation below 5 degrees, a software 
mask is typically employed in avionics GNSS receivers to exclude these satellites form the 
navigation computations (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008).  Tropospheric rainfall attenuation 
has a minor effect in the GNSS frequency bands.  For instance, at a frequency of 2 GHz the 
attenuation for high rainfall rates is less than 0.01 dB/km (rainfall attenuation below 2 GHz is 
even less).  Tropospheric scintillation is caused by irregularities (primarily turbulence) 
causing variations of the refractive index.  This effect varies with time, frequency and 
elevation angle.  For small omnidirectional antennas, such as GNSS antennas, the CCIR 
provided the following expression for the long-term rms amplitude scintillation (Boithias, 
1982):   
 
         
    (    )         (  ) (11) 
 
where f is the frequency in GHz.  The Noise Figure (  ) is related to the system noise 
temperature (Tsys) in Kelvin as follows (Davenport, 1987): 
 
        (  
    
  
)    (  ) (12) 
 
where    = 290K = 24.6 dB-K.  Tsys for antenna plus receiver can be computed using the Friis 
formula (Friis, 1944).  Typical    values for state-of-the-art GPS receivers are between 2 and 4 
dB.  Intentional and unintentional RF interference (jamming) can result in degraded 
navigation accuracy or complete loss of the GNSS receiver tracking.  Jammers can be 
classified into three broad categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum 
Jammers (SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ).  Fortunately, a number of effective 
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Jamming Q Rc (C/No)threshold C/No J/S
NBJ 1 1.023*106 25 dB-Hz 37 34.82
SSJ 1.5 1.023*106 25 dB-Hz 37 36.58
WGJ 2 1.023*106 25 dB-Hz 37 37.83
jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression) techniques have been 
developed for military GNSS applications and some of them are now available for civil use 
as well (Ward, 1994).  The J/S performance of a GNSS receiver at its tracking threshold can 
be evaluated by the following equation (Kaplan and Hegarty, 2006): 
 
            [
 
     (   )⁄    
 
 
     (   )⁄
] (13) 
 
where: 
Q  = processing gain adjustment factor (1 for NBJ, 1.5 for  SSJ and 2 for WGJ); 
    = code chipping rate (chips/s); 
(    )    = receiver tracking threshold (dB-Hz). 
 
Since the weak limit in an avionics receiver is the carrier tracking loop threshold (typically 
the PLL), this threshold is usually substituted for (    )   .  During the flight test activities 
performed on TORNADO-IDS with unaided C/A code avionics receivers, it was found that 
in all dynamics conditions explored and in the absence of jamming, a      of 25 dB-Hz was 
sufficient to keep tracking to the satellites.  As an example, using this 25 dB-Hz tracking 
threshold, we can calculate the J/S performance of the TORNDO-IDS GPS receiver 
considering one of the satellites tracked during the descent manoeuvre illustrated in Fig. 9.  
As shown in Fig. 13, during this manoeuvre, the C/N0 for PRN-14 was about 37 dB-Hz. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Calculated C/N0 for PRN-14. 
 
Table 1 shows the corresponding J/S calculations, assuming (C/No)MIN = 25 dB-Hz.   
 
Table 1.  J/S calculations for 25 dB-Hz tracking threshold. 
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Using these J/S values, the minimum range in metres from a jamming source can be 
calculated from: 
 
     
  
  
(  
                 
  ) (14) 
 
where: 
       = effective radiated power of the jammer (dBw); 
     = wavelength of jammer frequency (m); 
     = received (incident) jamming power level at threshold =         (dBw); 
     = minimum received (incident) signal power (dBw); 
     = GNSS antenna gain toward jammer (dBic); 
     = jammer power attenuation due to receiver front-end filtering (dB). 
 
 3.4. Doppler Shift Analysis.  Doppler shift is the change in frequency of the received 
signal that is experienced when the observer (aircraft) moves relative to the signal source 
(satellite).  The Doppler shift of the n
th
 satellite signal frequency is given by: 
 
     (
     
 
)       (15) 
 
where:  
    = satellite velocity; 
   = aircraft velocity; 
c  = speed of light; 
f  = GNSS signal frequency; 
    = angle between the aircraft velocity and the n
th 
satellite LOS vector. 
 
 During the initial phases of the GPS-TSPI flight test campaign (Sabatini and Palmerini, 
2008), it was noted that, even in high dynamics avionics receivers, the reacquisition time 
after loss of one or more satellite signals could be up to 40 seconds, depending on flight 
conditions and satellite constellations (Fig. 14).  Therefore, we investigated how the Doppler 
shift could affect the receiver capability to track the carrier phase and rapidly reacquire the 
signal after a loss.  Doppler shift directly affects the signal acquisition time of the receiver, 
both in terms of frequency of the code and frequency of the carrier.  In general, acquisition 
time increases in the presence of Doppler shift.  Considering the case of one satellite tracked, 
the Doppler shift is due to the relative velocity of the satellite and the receiver (i.e., the 
difference between the projections of the velocity vectors along the satellite-receiver 
direction).  The worst case is, therefore, that of an aircraft flying along the line of sight (LOS) 
to the satellite, in which the full velocity vector of the aircraft must be used to determine the 
relative velocity.  Analysis of receiver data recorded during several flights and up to speed of 
500 kts highlighted that the Doppler effect causes a frequency shift, with respect to the carrier 
frequency L1, which reaches a maximum value of about 15 KHz. This value is low if 
compared with the GPS signal bandwidth and the high dynamic characteristics of the carrier 
tracking loops internal to the avionics receiver guarantee that neither the data accuracy is 
degraded nor the carrier phase is lost because of Doppler shift.  Nevertheless, the coupling 
between such frequency shift and the signal reacquisition strategy of the receiver can 
significantly affects the time necessary to get data after a signal loss, even when a good 
satellite configuration is available.   
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Figure 14.  Doppler shift and signal acquisition in an avionics receiver. 
  
 3.5. Multipath Analysis.  Multipath is caused by the interference of multiple reflections 
(from the ground and the aircraft structure) with the direct signal transmitted by the satellite 
and represents a major source of error in GNSS observations.  The level and characteristics of 
multipath depend on the geometry of the environment surrounding the antenna, the 
reflectivity of nearby objects/terrain and the satellite elevation angle.  In order to build a 
reliable multipath model, a combination of signal analysis and geometric ray-tracing methods 
was adopted.  To start, we use the aircraft 3D CATIA model to identify the geometric 
characteristics of the multipath signal and study the Signal-to-Noise ratio variations in the 
presence of multipath (S/Nm). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Phase of GNSS signal. 
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From Fig. 15, the S/Nm and phase error for a single refection can be represented as a function 
of direct and multipath signal amplitudes and the multipath relative phase   (Ward, 1994): 
 
       
    
    
            (16) 
  
   (  )  
      
         
 (17) 
 
where    is the direct signal amplitude,    is multipath signal amplitude and   is the phase 
of the multipath.  Fig. 16 shows that both the multipath phase   and the multipath amplitude 
affect the received signal. Therefore, we require a multipath model to simulate these two 
factors, considering the reflections from the airframe and from the ground.  In our research, 
we adopted the Aeronautical Multipath Channel (AMC) model developed during the ESA-
SDS research (Steingass, 2004).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Variation of Ac as function of the angle . 
 
Fig. 17 illustrates the overall structure of the AMC model.  Let h(t, ) be the impulse response 
of the multipath channel model.  Then h(t, ) is given by (Steingass, 2004): 
 
 (   )    ∑√  
 
   
   ( )   (    ) (18) 
 
where    is the Echo Power of the i
th
 path. The signal   ( ) is a noise signal with Power i, and 
a power spectral density ( ): 
 
 ( )  {      
                              
 
 
                
                                
 (19) 
 
where B is the noise bandwidth. From the multipath channel model in Fig. 18, the wing 
reflection, the fuselage reflection and the ground-echo are the main components of the 
multipath signal.   
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Figure 17.  AMC model structure. 
 
Fig. 18 shows the geometric reflection model.  The incoming wave is emitted from point T, R 
is the receiver location and S is the reflection point.  V is a defined point on the reflecting 
surface and n stands for a unit vector normal to the surface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Geometric reflection model. 
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In ray-tracing the reflection point S and the defined point V should satisfy the equation: 
 
(   )      (20) 
 
and the line equation connecting T and       : 
 
      (        ) (21) 
 
where t is a parameter between 0 and 1.  Combining Eqs. (20) and (21): 
 
    
       
  (        )
(        ) (22) 
 
The corresponding extra path length,    , due to specular reflection, is then: 
 
    |   |  |   |  |   | (23) 
 
In our wing reflection model, the wing is assumed to be flat.  By Gaussian Doppler Spectrum 
theory, the power of the wing echo spectrum is assumed to be (Braasch, 1992): 
 
   (  )        (
 
√    
  
 
  
   ) (24) 
 
where the deviation   = 3.8 Hz.  The wing reflection signal delay can be calculated from: 
 
      ( )  
        ( )
  
 (25) 
 
where L is the antenna height from the wing, E is the elevation angle (degrees) and    is the 
speed of light.  The fuselage is assumed to be a cylinder and the power of the fuselage echo 
spectrum is given by: 
 
     (  )          [    
(   | | )        ] (26) 
 
where    ,    and    are the fuselage geometric coefficients described in (Steingass and 
Lehner, 2004).  Previous research showed that the fuselage reflection characteristics change 
very little by increasing the fuselage radius.  For easier implementation of the fuselage 
reflection model, a 2-dimensional polynomial function of 4
th
 order was fitted to each 
parameter (mean, b2, b3).  As an example, considering the TORNADO-IDS upper antenna 
located on the fuselage at a height of          = 0.05 metres, the fuselage reflection time 
delay is                 
   s.  Ground reflection becomes important only during the 
landing phase, when the aircraft is in close proximity of the terrain.  Like before, assuming a 
Gaussian distributed ground reflection amplitude with zero mean, the ground-echo power can 
be described by Eq. (24).  Assuming that the terrain is flat: 
 
       ( )  
        ( )
  
 (27) 
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where h is the aircraft altitude and E is the elevation angle.  Obviously, this basic ground-
echo model can be expanded to take into account various terrain and man-made building 
geometries.  As discussed in (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996), GPS receivers can effectively 
reject most of the multipath signal if the differential delay           for the C/A code and 
0.15    for the P(Y) code. As a consequence, the region of potential ground-echo multipath 
problems for the C/A code is:  
 
     ( )  (      )             (28) 
 
Simulation and test activities performed on various military aircraft showed that, above this 
threshold, the fuselage reflections are normally the main contributors to the airframe 
multipath.  In particular, it was found that the airframe multipath ranging error budget can be 
minimised by placing the GNSS antenna 5 (or more) centimetres above the highest point on 
the aircraft fuselage.  Applying this criterion to the TORNADO-IDS antenna installation, the 
airframe multipath error associated to each satellite remained below 2 metres in all relevant 
flight conditions and aircraft-satellite relative geometries.  To investigate the effects of 
ground-echo multipath on the TORNADO-IDS GPS receiver, flight test activities were 
performed with satellite elevation angles between 5 and 90 degrees and bank/pitch angles 
exceeding 45 degrees.  In these conditions, it was observed that the no significant ground-
echo multipath is present for altitudes above 500 feet AGL.  As this value is much lower that 
the theoretical threshold established by Eq. (28), it was concluded that the signal attenuation 
due to ground reflectivity was responsible for the reduced susceptibility to ground-echo 
multipath.  Nevertheless, reducing the aircraft altitude below 500 feet AGL and performing 
attitude manoeuvres exceeding 45 degrees, significant ground-echo multipath errors were 
experienced.  In particular, it was observed that the effect of ground-echo signals translated 
into a sudden increase of the multipath ranging error of up to two orders of magnitude with 
respect to the airframe multipath errors alone.  During a low-level TORNADO-IDS flight 
trial, it was found that the ground-multipath ranging error reached a value of about 140 
metres when the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 300 feet AGL over flat terrain with a roll 
angle exceeding 45 degrees.  It must be pointed out, however, that such particular flight 
conditions are only likely to be encountered in military aircraft and some UAV applications.  
Due to the flight profile requirements and manoeuvring constraints of typical airliners, the 
ground multipath contributions can be normally neglected in these cases.  According to the 
Standard Multipath Error Model (SMEM) research (Murphy et al., 2004) and experimental 
validation activities performed in the United States on various types of civil airliners (Booth 
et al., 2000), the airframe multipath ranging error (          ) associated to a satellite 
observation can be calculated directly as a function of the satellite elevation angle: 
 
                     
( 
 
  
)
  (29) 
 
This model was endorsed by the ICAO GNSS panel (Booth et al., 2000) and included in the 
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for the Local Area Augmentation 
System (RTCA, 2004) and for the Wide Area Augmentation System (RTCA, 2006).  Further 
research is currently in progress at CSV-RSV, NGI and CU on other airframe types, 
including general aviation aircraft and various classes of UAVs.  For small UAV platforms, 
multipath effects associated with low-level flight in urban environments is being also 
investigated.  Preliminary results obtained with small-size UAVs show that multipath ranging 
errors in excess of 100 metres are possible when the vehicle flies in proximity of large 
20 
 
buildings.  Further research is needed to corroborate these initial findings and to obtain useful 
models for the various classes of UAV platforms considered for the ABIA development.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS.  In addition to SBAS and GBAS, GNSS augmentation can be obtained 
processing the information obtained from the other avionics sensors.  In most cases, the other 
sensors operate via separate principles than the GNSS and, therefore, are not subject to the 
same sources of error or interference.  A system such as this is referred to as ABAS.  In our 
research, an ABAS system was developed specifically targeting GNSS integrity 
augmentation for manned and unmanned aircraft, including both mission- and safety-critical 
applications.  In this ABIA system, the aircraft sensors provide information on the aircraft 
relevant flight parameters to an IFG, which is also connected to the on-board GNSS.  Using 
the available data on GNSS and the aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals are generated 
which can be displayed on one of the cockpit displays and/or sent to an AWG.  Additionally, 
the ABIA system can provide steering information to the pilot or electronic commands to the 
aircraft/UAV FCS, allowing for real-time integrity monitoring, avoidance of safety/mission-
critical flight conditions and fast recovery of the RNP in case of GNSS data degradation or 
loss.  In this first paper, we have presented the fundamental design features of this novel 
ABIA system.  Additionally, the key mathematical models required for the ABIA integrity 
flags have been introduced (i.e., antenna obscuration, geometric accuracy degradations, SNR, 
multipath and Doppler shift).  The ABIA integrity flag thresholds criteria and a detailed 
TORNADO-IDS simulation case study will be presented in the second part of this paper.   
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